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4 This result is consistent with the preannouncement of bad news by firms in order to influence analysts to revise their forecasts downward (see Skinner, 1997; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 1999) earnings management is not new, it has swelled in a market that is unforgiving of companies that miss their estimates. I recently read of one major U.S. company, that failed to meet its so-called 'numbers' by one penny, and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day" (emphasis added).
Although asset pricing theory does not predict a differential market reaction to positive and negative forecast errors, these comments by SEC officials suggest that the market disproportionately penalizes firms that fail to meet analysts' expectations.
The second issue we examine in this study is whether the market adjusts analysts' forecasts based on historical trends. A Business Week article (Vickers, 1999 ) cites a study conducted by First Call and IBES International, which found that 1,025 of 6,000 companies beat earnings estimates in at least nine of twelve quarters during 1996-1999 (approximately 17% of the sample examined). The article further states that, "Investors are coming to expect surprises from some companies, so they are losing their oomph." Pulliam (1999) provides further anecdotal evidence that the market actually penalizes firms that manage earnings to meet analysts forecasts. In contrast, empirical results reported in Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) provide indirect evidence that the market appears to reward companies that consistently report positive earnings surprises. Barth, et al. (1999) find that firms with a consistent pattern of earnings increases command higher price-to-earnings multiples after controlling for earnings levels. We provide direct evidence regarding this issue by examining the sensitivity of stock prices to analysts' forecast errors for a sample of firms that consistently report positive forecast errors.
We find that after controlling for the magnitude of unexpected earnings, the price reaction to meeting or not meeting analysts' forecasts within a short window surrounding the earnings announcement is symmetrical and, on average, approximates 0.8% and -0.9%, respectively. As we expand the return window, we find the market penalty for not meeting analysts' forecasts increases to about 4 percent. 4 Consistent with this finding, Skinner and Sloan (1999) report evidence that the stock market reaction to negative earnings surprises for growth firms tends to be large and asymmetric.
Using price regressions, Kasznik and McNichols (1999) (KM) also document a positive association between firm value and meeting analysts' expectations but only for companies that meet forecasts in two consecutive years. In addition, this result is largely dominated by the increasing earnings effect documented in Barth, et al. (1999) . Our study differs from KM primarily in its use of quarterly forecasts and a short window return design, which allows us to conduct more powerful tests since confounding events that contaminate the dependent variable are less likely to exist within the short window. Moreover, price regressions (or levels studies) are more susceptible to omitted variables problems as evidenced by the numerous studies using levels regressions that have documented incremental value-relevance of items not included in book value or earnings (e.g., Beaver, et al. 1989; Barth, et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996 ; among many others). The short window design allows us to more readily attribute any market response to the regression variables. In contrast to the results documented in KM, we find that meeting analysts' forecasts is a very important explanatory variable in all periods tested even after controlling for the increasing earnings effect.
Our empirical tests also show that the earnings multiple is significantly higher for firms that meet analysts' forecasts. In fact, the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for firms that meet (do not meet)
expectations is approximately 1.05 (0.07). Thus, our results suggest that the penalty for failing to meet forecasts is essentially unrelated to the magnitude of unexpected earnings. On the other hand, a high association exists between the magnitude of unexpected earnings and abnormal returns for firms that meet analysts' expectations.
We investigate the robustness of our results by controlling for loss firms, preannouncement of bad news, the permanence of reported unexpected earnings, and the increasing earnings effect as documented in Barth, et al. (1999) (mentioned earlier). Our results are generally consistent with those reported in Hayn (1995) that the ERC for loss firms is essentially zero. However, we find that meeting analysts' forecasts is a more powerful variable in explaining abnormal returns than is the profit or loss position of the firm. Specifically, the adjusted-R 2 in the abnormal return/unexpected earnings regression increases by 52% when a dummy loss variable is included in the model; however, the adjusted-R 2 increases by 260% when a dummy variable is included that indicates whether analysts' forecasts have been met or not.
Finally, we find that the market recognizes and adjusts for the historical forecast error of firms that exhibit a systematic pattern of reporting positive or negative unexpected earnings. This result is consistent with findings in Barth, et al. (1999) that earnings multiples are related to a firm's reporting history. However, where Barth, et al. (1999) report that the market assigns a higher multiple to the earnings of firms with a pattern of earnings increases, we find the earnings multiples are attenuated when a company has a history of consistently reporting positive or negative forecast errors. More importantly, while our results indicate that the market fully adjusts for systematic negative forecast errors, only a partial adjustment is made when the systematic component is positive. This evidence is consistent with the market providing an additional return premium for firms that consistently report earnings in excess of analysts' estimates.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the increasing frequency of positive forecast errors documented in several concurrent studies (e.g., Brown, 1998; Matsumoto, 1999; Richardson, et al., 1999) is a rational response by managers to three market-related incentives. First, the market provides a premium to positive forecast errors and assigns a higher multiple to the level of positive unexpected earnings. Second, the market penalizes firms for failing to meet forecasts and the penalty is essentially unrelated to the size of the forecast error. Third, though the market recognizes a historical pattern of 5 The consensus analyst forecast is calculated using the last forecast of every analyst reporting a forecast on IBES for firm i in quarter t.
forecast errors, it does not fully discount systematically positive forecast errors. The premium provided to firms that consistently meet analysts' forecasts and the nonlinear relation between abnormal returns and unexpected earnings is perhaps not fully consistent with an efficient market, but this phenomenon provides a partial explanation for managers' fixation on reporting positive unexpected earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the research design.
Section 3 describes the sample selection procedures and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 offers a brief summary and presents our conclusions.
Research Design
Numerous studies have investigated the information content of earnings by regressing abnormal returns, cumulated over a short window surrounding the earnings announcement date, on unexpected earnings. We use the basic abnormal return/unexpected earnings specification as a benchmark model to evaluate all subsequent modifications. The basic regression model takes the following form:
where:
CAR i,t = a 3-day market-adjusted return for firm i over the interval extending from one trading day prior to the earnings announcement date through one trading day after the earnings announcement.
UE i,t = unexpected earnings for firm i, which is defined as the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share in quarter t and the consensus analyst forecast as obtained from IBES, deflated by the end-of-quarter stock price.
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This study posits that the information content of earnings depends on whether reported earnings meets analysts' forecasts. To examine this concept, we estimate the following expanded regression equation:
6 The robustness of our results were checked by utilizing a variety of methods to classify firms as having a consistent tendency to report positive or negative forecast errors. Additionally, we used different methods to measure PHIST and NHIST. These methods include setting PHIST and NHIST to zero unless the forecast errors in at least 10 of the prior 12 quarters have the same sign, in which case, PHIST and NHIST are equal to the median CAR i,t = a 0 + a 1 MET i,t + ß 1 UE i,t + ß 2 (UE i,t *MET i,t ) + e i
MET i,t = 1 when actual earnings in the current quarter meet or exceed the consensus analyst earnings forecast; otherwise 0.
Both the intercept and slope coefficients are of interest in equation (2). The intercept coefficients (a 0 and a 1 ) provide information about the market's reaction to meeting analysts' forecasts without respect to the level of unexpected earnings. The UE*MET interaction measures the differential market response to the level of unexpected earnings based on whether analysts' expectations have been met. Price regressions presented in Kaznick and McNichols (1999) suggest that meeting analysts' forecasts increases firm value; however, the use of short-window returns in equation (2) allows our tests to draw stronger conclusions on the market reaction to earnings announcements that meet analysts' forecasts.
The second issue addressed in this study is the effect of a firm's historical tendency to report earnings in excess of analysts' forecasts on the market's interpretation of the current period's forecast error. If the market recognizes and adjusts for these systematic forecast errors, then the following model better specifies the abnormal return/unexpected earnings relation.
CAR i,t = a 0 + a 1 MET i,t + ß 1 UE i,t + ß 2 (UE i,t *MET i,t ) + ß 3 NHIST i,t + ß 4 PHIST i,t + e i (3) where:
PHIST i,t = 0 unless unexpected earnings (UE) for firm i in the previous four quarters and the current quarter is positive, in which case, PHIST equals the median unexpected earnings for the past 4 quarters.
NHIST i,t = 0 unless unexpected earnings (UE) for firm i in the previous four quarters and the current quarter is negative, in which case, NHIST equals the median unexpected earnings for the past 4 quarters.
forecast errors for the same time span. This procedure results in a smaller sample size due to more observations required to establish a firm's reporting tendency. Nevertheless, all results reported in the following tables are qualitatively similar using this alternative method. In addition, we classified firms using the previous four quarters, but excluding the current quarter. This method resulted in quantitatively and qualitatively similar results to those reported in the tables.
7 For reasons provided in Table 1 , companies must have available on the Compustat Quarterly database reported earnings-per-share before extraordinary items (item no. 19), quarter-end stock price (item no. 14), and the earnings announcement date. Most of the observations that were eliminated from this step are due to missing earnings announcement dates.
While our primary research focus is on firms that consistently report positive forecast errors, we separate historical forecast errors into positive and negative values; PHIST and NHIST. This is done for two reasons. First, significant differences in variation between the two components could affect the coefficient values (Collins and Kothari, 1989) . For instance, we might expect a lower variance for PHIST due to companies managing their earnings to report a smooth flow of income that exceeds analysts' forecasts by a small amount. On the other side, negative forecast errors might be more variable due to asset write-offs or other large transitory items. Second, this design allows us to investigate whether the market responds differently to the reporting tendencies of management.
Description of Sample

Sample Selection Procedures
The initial sample consists of 94,632 firm-quarter observations (2,713 firms) from 1983 through 1998 for which earnings data, analyst forecast data, and stock return data are available on the 1998 versions of Compustat, IBES, and CRSP databases. Criteria to be retained in the final sample are outlined in Panel A of Table 1 . Insufficient Compustat and CRSP data reduced the sample by 1,974 firmquarter observations. 7 Our research design requires four quarters of prior IBES forecast and actual EPS data to establish the reporting tendencies of the sample firms. Accordingly, the initial 4 observations for each firm are not available to be used in the regression equations, which further reduced the sample by 8 The 10,510 firm-quarter observations eliminated due to this selection criteria is less than 4 times the number of firms in the sample because some firms had the necessary IBES EPS data to establish their reporting tendencies, but were eliminated before due to lack of Compustat and/or CRSP data.
9 Although the sample selection criteria are necessary to conduct abnormal return/unexpected earnings regression analyses, in order to establish the reporting tendencies of our sample firms (i.e., whether the firm consistently reports positive or negative forecast errors), we employed all available observations from IBES.
10 Forecast errors are computed using actual earnings as obtained from IBES to ensure consistency of the earnings construct (see footnote to Table 1 for a description of how we use compustat EPS to control for potential discrepancies related to stock splits and dividends).
10,510 firm-quarter observations. 8 To control for data errors, we eliminate observations with marketadjusted equity returns and deflated analysts' forecast errors in the extreme 1% tails of their respective distributions. Finally, the earnings announcement date obtained from Compustat Quarterly preceded the quarter end for 180 additional observations. We assumed these earnings announcements are data errors and deleted them, which yields our final sample of 78,820 firm-quarter observations (2,693 firms).
Financial statement data and the earnings announcement date were obtained from Compustat Quarterly.
Stock return data were obtained from CRSP. Analyst information and actual earnings-per-share data were obtained from IBES. 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel B of Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample. Of particular interest are the results related to unexpected earnings, defined as the difference between actual earnings-per-share (EPS) and the IBES consensus analyst forecast. 10 Mean unexpected earnings pooled over time is significantly negative (-$0.029), which is consistent with an optimistic analyst forecast bias documented in previous research. However, the percentage of positive to negative forecast errors is actually greater than 1.
To provide more descriptive evidence on the behavior of analysts' forecasts, Table 2 This result is consistent with Brown (1998) and with suggestions made by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt that firms are increasingly motivated to meet or beat analysts earnings estimates.
The forecast accuracy of analysts seems to have improved over time. Table 2 indicates that during the 80's, the percentage of forecasts that were exactly equal to actual EPS was approximately 13-14%. During the 90's, the percentage increased to almost 18%. These statistics are similar to results documented in Matsumoto (1999) .
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Empirical Results
Meeting Current Analysts' Forecasts
Our initial tests investigate whether a differential response exists for firm-year observations that meet analysts' forecasts compared to those that do not. Table 3 The results in panel B of table 3 show a significantly positive coefficient on MET, which indicates that meeting current expectations is a very important factor in the value formulation of the firm. In fact, firms meeting expectations experience a positive stock price reaction of 0.7% (a 0 + a 1 ) that is unrelated to the magnitude of unexpected earnings. This result is in direct contrast to the results for firms that do not meet expectations. The coefficient value for a 0 indicates that these firms experience a stock price reaction of -0.10% that is independent of the magnitude of unexpected earnings. Controlling for crosssectional dependence in the error terms, we find that all 14 of the separate annual regressions produce a coefficient that has the same sign for both intercept terms. The significant coefficient for a 1 indicates a difference in stock returns between the two groups of firms even after controlling for the magnitude of unexpected earnings.
Focusing on the slope coefficients, ß 1 and ß 2 , we find that stock prices are more sensitive to positive forecast errors at the earnings announcement date. The earnings response coefficient for firms that meet and do not meet analysts' expectations is 1.086 (ß 1 + ß 2 using the inter-temporal coefficient estimates) and 0.093 (ß 1 ), respectively. The significantly positive interaction term (UE*MET) indicates that the ERC is greater for firms that beat current forecasts. This result suggests that the information content of current earnings that are below expectations may be limited with respect to future cash flows.
We recognize our MET variable could be capturing the effects of several confounding variables.
First, Hayn (1995) documents that the association between contemporaneous price movements and earnings is essentially zero for loss firms. If the MET variable proxies for profit firms, the results reported in Table 3 would merely be a replication of the finding by Hayn (1995) .
Second, several articles in the popular press suggest that managers attempt to influence analysts' forecasts downward in order to report actual earnings that meet the forecasts. A growing body of research indicates that earnings pre-announcements are made primarily by companies with bad news (Skinner, 1994 (Skinner, & 1997 Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 1999) . If firms that fail to meet expectations pre-announce this fact, most of the information in reported earnings should already be impounded into prices prior to the official earnings announcement. This phenomenon might explain the weak association between returns and unexpected earnings for firms that fail to meet expectations documented in Table 3 .
Third, Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) find that companies with patterns of increasing earnings have higher earnings multiples compared to other firms. Kaznick and McNichols (1999) find that in their price regressions, MET is dominated by this increasing earnings effect. Thus, MET may simply be a proxy for a consistent pattern of earnings increases.
Finally, another potential explanation for these results is that MET is capturing an earnings permanence effect. That is, when a firm reports positive earnings news, the market anticipates that this performance will continue in the future; whereas, disappointing earnings surprises are expected to be temporary. The relatively large earnings response coefficient for positive forecast errors might be a reflection of this disparity in expected earnings persistence. Similar to the conclusion presented in Hayn (1995), a potential explanation for the disparity in the market's expectation with respect to the persistence of earnings news is that shareholders might place less importance on negative earnings surprises because they can always liquidate the firm rather than experience continued poor performance.
Does the MET variable proxy for profit firms?
To test for the possibility that MET proxies for profit firms, we partition the sample on the basis of whether the firm reports current period losses or profits and re-estimate equation (2) for each subsample.
The results of these tests are reported in panels A and B of Table 4 . The results for the profit subsample are almost identical to the results for the full sample in Table 3 , which indicates that these results are not driven by loss firms. In other words, even after controlling for whether a firm reports a loss, meeting expectations is informative to the market and contributes significantly to the model's explanatory power.
The results in panel B of Table 4 for loss firms are different from the results for the full sample and the profit subsample. We find for these firms that not meeting expectations is still accompanied by a negative market reaction (-1.2%) independent of the level of unexpected earnings. However, the intercept for loss firms that meet expectations is 0.002 and not statistically significant. Both the pooled and inter-temporal estimate for the slope coefficient on UE is only marginally significant. Additionally, the UE*MET interaction term is not significant. Thus, the difference in ERCs across firms that met and did not meet current expectations, appears to hold only for profit firms. These results are consistent with Hayn's (1995) findings that losses are not associated with contemporaneous price movements. Our evidence supports her conclusion regardless of whether the firm met or did not meet current earnings forecasts.
As an alternative to estimating separate regressions for two subsamples, we also estimate a fully interactive model after including a second dummy variable in the regression model to control for loss firms as follows:
CAR i,t = a 0 + a 1 MET i,t + a 2 LOSS i,t + ß 1 UE i,t + ß 2 (UE i,t *MET i,t ) + ß 3 (LOSS i,t *UE i,t ) + ß 4 (MET it *LOSS i,t *UE i,t ) + e i
LOSS i,t = 1 if the actual quarterly earnings per share for firm i in period t is negative, otherwise 0.
All other variables are as previously defined. The pooled regression and separate annual return regression results from estimating equation (4) are contained in Table 4 , panel C. The intercept variable a 2 suggests that the market penalizes loss firms slightly more (-0.3%) than profit firms even after controlling for whether analysts' expectations were met. In general, the interpretation of the slope coefficients are equivalent to those obtained from separate regressions in panels A and B.
It should be noted that the increase in the adjusted-R 2 from including MET in the returns/earnings regression is substantially higher than the increase from including LOSS. As reported in Skinner and Sloan (1999) . We also employ an additional return metric that extends from the last day of the quarter to one day after the earnings announcement. Results using this alternative metric are virtually identical to those reported in Table 5. loss variable is included in the model and interacted with unexpected earnings, the adjusted-R 2 increases to 1.94 percent (not reported in the tables). However, when MET is included in the model, the adjusted-R 2 increases to 4.82 percent. Inserting LOSS into a regression that already includes MET results in a 3.1% increase in adjusted-R 2 . However, inserting MET into a regression that already includes LOSS results in a 156% increase. Thus, although the inclusion of LOSS provides an increase in the model's explanatory power, the evidence indicates that meeting expectations is a much more important factor in the earnings/returns relationship than is the profit or loss status of a firm.
Bad news pre-announcements by management
To explore the issue of whether the significant interaction term documented in Table 3 is driven by bad news pre-announcements, we calculate returns for our sample that extend from ten days before the last day of the quarter through the day after the earnings announcement. This return window is likely to capture most of the information disclosed about earnings prior to the actual earnings announcement.
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Using this new return metric, we re-estimate equations (2) and (4). If the results in Tables 3 and 4 are driven by earnings pre-announcements that are made primarily by firms that do not expect to meet analysts' forecasts, then the differences in the ERCs between the two subsamples should be attenuated in regressions that employ a longer return window. Table 5 reports the results from these additional regressions. The expanded window increases the coefficient estimates and improves the models' adjusted R 2 's. Although there is evidence consistent with bad news being pre-announced, in general, the overall conclusions obtained from the results in Tables   3 and 4 remain unchanged. Focusing on the fully interactive model that includes dummy variables for both meeting analysts' forecasts and reporting a loss (panel B), we see that not meeting analysts'
forecasts is accompanied by a negative 3.7% return (all analysis employ the inter-temporal coefficient estimates), regardless of the magnitude of the forecast error. This market penalty is significantly larger than what is documented in Table 4 , which is consistent with the pre-announcement of bad news. The sum of a 0 and a 1 is 0.6% and statistically significant at the .01 level. This result corresponds with earlier tests that indicate meeting analysts' forecasts is rewarded by the market; furthermore, the 0.6% return premium is not significantly different from the 0.7% return premium documented in Table 4 . The loss intercept term remains significantly negative, indicating loss firms are penalized by the market independent of the forecast error. The 1% penalty documented for the long window return is significantly more negative than the 0.3% penalty reported in Table 4 . Once again, this evidence is consistent with bad news being impounded in prices prior to the earnings announcement.
Except for ß 3 , which is not significantly different from zero in either table, the absolute values of the slope coefficients are all higher in Table 5 . This result is not surprising since more of the information reflected in earnings is being captured by price within the long window. However, the overall tenor of the conclusions obtained from the data in Table 5 is virtually identical to what was derived from Table 4 .
In summary, the results in Table 5 provide evidence that bad news tends to be pre-announced by managers. However, we still find a strong differential market response to the unexpected earnings of firms that meet analysts' expectations. In addition, the evidence suggests that not meeting expectations is accompanied by a negative stock price return of approximately 4%. These results offer a potential explanation for managers' fixation on reporting positive unexpected earnings. Further, if the market recognizes managers' incentives to report positive forecast errors in order to avoid the stock price penalty for not meeting forecasts, this might reinforce their beliefs that negative forecast errors are temporary in nature, which would help explain the relatively low ERC for these firms. 13 We use quarterly earnings periods instead of annual periods. Some additional observations for each firm were lost in this robustness test since at least six prior period observations are required to construct D up ; whereas, for our main results, the reporting history for each firm was derived using only the first four observations.
Controlling for the increasing earnings effect
We investigate the possibility that the results documented for MET capture the increasing earnings effect documented in Barth, et al. (1999 To examine the robustness of our reported results, the newly constructed variable, D up , is added to regression equation (2) as an additional intercept term and also, interacted with UE and UE*MET.
Results from this regression equation are presented in Table 6 . Both the pooled regressions and the mean coefficients from annual regressions indicate that the effect of meeting expectations is not subsumed by the increasing earnings effect. In fact, as suggested by the insignificant coefficient on UE*D up coupled with the significance of the three way interaction (UE*MET*D up ), the increasing earnings effect is present only when the firm met analysts' forecasts in the current period. Similarly, Barth, et al. (1999) document that earnings multiples decline when a firm breaks a pattern of increasing earnings in the current period.
Does MET proxy for earnings permanence?
Previous research documents that the market's response to reported earnings is positively associated with its permanence. A potential explanation for results presented in tables 3-6 is that positive forecast errors are more permanent in nature and thus, the MET variable is capturing this effect. We examine this possibility by including in the regression equation a proxy for permanence simultaneously with MET. The permanence proxy we use is analysts' forecast revisions. If reported earnings are considered permanent in nature, analysts should revise their forecasts for future earnings accordingly.
The forecast error for quarter t is partitioned into its permanent and transitory components by examining individual analyst revisions of earnings forecasts for quarter t+1 subsequent to the earnings announcement for quarter t. The regression equation is expressed as follows: 
PostFX eFX n i j t i j t j n
where PostFX i,j,t+1 is the quarter t+1 earnings forecast (deflated by end of quarter t price) for company i made by analyst j subsequent to quarter t's earnings announcement and PreFX is the same earnings forecast made prior to quarter t's earnings announcement. UE T is simply the total forecast error minus UE P .
Equation (5) The results from estimating equation (5) are presented in Table 7 . The tenor of the conclusions made from previous results remain unchanged. That is, MET is an important explanatory variable in the earnings/returns association even after controlling for the potential difference in permanence between positive and negative forecast errors. Consistent with expectations, the permanent component of both positive and negative unexpected earnings are valued higher by the market than the transitory components.
Market's Response to Systematic Forecast Errors
The second issue we examine in this study is the market response to a systematic pattern in historical forecast errors. If the historical tendencies of firms to consistently exceed or miss analysts'
estimates are recognized by an efficient market, we might expect adjustments for these patterns in forming earnings expectations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the market either revises analysts' forecasts based on a firm's historical tendency to report positive forecast errors, suggesting that no reward is attached to this systematic behavior, or alternatively penalizes firms for this behavior (Vickers 1999; and Pulliam 1999) . The results reported in Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) , however, seem to contradict both of these positions suggesting that a return premium is provided for a consistent pattern of earnings increases.
14 Measurement error of the systematic component of unexpected earnings could also contribute to these results. However, the findings are robust to alternative measurement methods. Additionally, given our previous discussion regarding the variability of positive and negative forecast errors, if measurement error in the systematic component does exist, we would expect it to be greater for negative than positive forecast errors. Thus, if measurement error were a problem we would expect to see it manifested in the coefficient on NHIST before PHIST. The fact that the coefficient on NHIST is insignificantly different than UE in absolute magnitude suggests that measurement error is not a significant problem in our regressions.
Pooled regression and separate annual regression results for equation (3) are presented in Table   8 . The coefficient on UE is positive and highly significant. Consistent with the results in earlier tables, the coefficients on MET and the MET*UE interaction are positive and highly significant (p-values<0.01).
Consistent with the market identifying and discounting the systematic component of unexpected earnings, we find that the coefficients on both PHIST and NHIST are negative but the PHIST coefficient is only marginally significant.
To examine whether the market places any value on the systematic component of the forecast errors, we examine the response coefficients to the different components of earnings. For firms that met (did not meet) current forecasts, a full adjustment for the systematic component of the forecast error implies that ß 1 + ß 2 + ß 4 (ß 1 + ß 3 ) equals zero. Table 8 indicates that ß 1 + ß 3 is not significantly different from zero, indicating that systematically negative forecast errors are fully discounted by the market.
For firms that met analysts' forecasts, the sum of ß 1 + ß 2 + ß 4 is significantly positive (pvalue<0.01). This evidence, in conjunction with the marginally significant coefficient on PHIST in equation (3), suggests that while the market adjusts for systematically positive forecast errors, it is not a full adjustment. 14 This evidence is consistent with the market providing an additional premium to firms that report earnings that consistently beat analysts' estimates. This finding provides a partial explanation for the results documented in Table 2 and other research suggesting that managers are motivated in recent years to produce realized earnings that meet or exceed analysts' forecasts. One interpretation of 15 One interpretation of the Table 2 results is that the behavior of managers has changed with respect to the reporting of earnings relative to analysts' forecasts. The change seems to have occurred between 1992 and 1994. In 1992 the reported positive forecast errors were only 96% of the negative forecast errors, however, by 1994 the positive forecast errors represented 136% of the negative forecast errors. A potential explanation for the apparent change in management behavior is that the market has changed its behavior. Separate annual regressions of equation (2), not reported, indicate that the apparent change in the behavior of managers was precipitated by a change in the behavior of the market. The results show a 58% increase in the coefficient on UE*MET from 1991 (0.96) to 1992 (1.52), which suggests that stock prices have become increasingly more sensitive to positive forecast errors. Consistent with this, the average ERC for firms that met expectations for the years 1985 through 1991 is 0.72 while the average ERC for the same firms for the years 1992 through 1998 is 1.39 (an increase of 93%).
this evidence is that managers understand market behavior and respond accordingly.
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Conclusion
Meeting or exceeding analysts' earnings forecasts is becoming an increasingly more common occurrence. During the years 1984-1992, approximately 50% of firms met or exceeded analysts
forecasts. This ratio increased dramatically in the years after 1992 to approximately 65%. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on two issues related to the market response to these reporting trends: 1) is there a differential market response to the level of unexpected earnings for firms that meet analysts'
forecasts versus those that do not? and 2) does the market provide a premium for firms' with a historical tendency to report positive forecast errors?
The results indicate that meeting current expectations is a very important variable in the pricing of unexpected earnings. In addition, we document evidence that the market adjusts for historical tendencies in firms' reporting behavior. More specifically, we find that for firms that consistently report a negative forecast error, the market fully adjusts for the systematic component of the forecast error. Although a significant adjustment is made for systematic positive forecast errors, we find that the adjustment is not complete. Lastly, we find that meeting analysts' forecasts is a more powerful variable in explaining abnormal returns than is the profit or loss position of the firm. Overall, these results have important implications for studies testing market reactions to earnings announcements since analysts' forecasts are commonly used as proxies for the market's expectation of earnings.
Our results are consistent with the notion that the informativeness of current earnings that are below expectations is limited with respect to future cash flows. A potential explanation is that not meeting analysts forecasts is perceived by the market as a temporary condition. As such, the earnings of these firms are more weakly associated with returns than the earnings of firms that meet forecasts. In general, not meeting analysts forecasts is likely to be considered by investors to be a temporary state for two reasons. First, managers recognize the penalty that is attached to earnings announcements that fail to achieve analysts expectations, and accordingly will try to avoid being in such a state. Second, shareholders can always liquidate the firm rather than suffer less than satisfactory earnings (Hayn 1995) .
Finally, our evidence provides a basis for interpreting the behavior of managers with respect to the reporting of earnings in excess of analysts' forecasts. Our evidence is consistent with managers reporting more positive forecast errors for three market driven reasons: the market attaches a significantly higher multiple to the earnings of firms that meet or exceed analysts forecasts, the market penalizes firms that fail to meet expectations regardless of the size of the forecast error, and the market prices the positive systematic component of forecast errors. The evidence reported in this paper is consistent with the view that managers are responding to the incentives provided by the market by attempting to manage earnings and forecasts that allow the firm to consistently meet or exceed analysts expectations. [14/14] a CAR = the 3-day market-adjusted abnormal return using the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio return cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings announcement date. UE = unexpected earnings; defined as the difference between reported earnings and the consensus analyst forecast deflated by stock price at the end of the quarter. MET = 1 when actual earnings meet or exceed analysts' forecasts; otherwise, MET = 0. a CAR = the 3-day market-adjusted abnormal return using the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio return cumulated from one trading day before to one trading day after the earnings announcement date. UE P = the earnings forecast for quarter t+1 after the earnings announcement of quarter t minus the earnings forecast for quarter t+1 before the earnings announcement of quarter t; i.e., the forecast revision for quarter t+1 after quarter t's earnings announcement. Forecast revisions are calculated for each analyst and the average forecast revision is used to proxy for the permanent component of unexpected earnings in quarter t (UE P ). UE T = Total unexpected earnings minus UE P . MET = 1 when actual earnings meet or exceed analysts' forecasts; otherwise, MET = 0. PHIST i,t = 0 unless unexpected earnings (UE) for firm i in the previous four quarters and the current quarter is positive, in which case, PHIST equals the median unexpected earnings for the past 4 quarters. NHIST i,t = 0 unless unexpected earnings (UE) for firm i in the previous four quarters and the current quarter is negative, in which case, NHIST equals the median unexpected earnings for the past 4 quarters.
